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Arabs at War is a comprehensive narrative of Arab armies’ combat perfor-
mance. It provides the first encyclopedic examination of how Arab militaries
operate in war or war-like conditions. It evidences wide reading, synthesis, and
an accessible writing style. It is certain to serve as a point of reference for fur-
ther work. For all its strengths, the book remains deeply problematic in that it
does not break any new conceptual ground. The result is an immensely enjoy-
able read that does not reshape our analytical paradigm.
To evaluate military effectiveness, one first must define the term, and Pol-
lack’s book is deficient. “Military effectiveness,” for Pollack, entails “the abil-
ity of an armed service to prosecute military operations and employ weaponry in
military operations” (p. 3). This is part of the definition. Yet military effective-
ness is not synonymous with combat effectiveness unless one implies military
operations consist solely of war, which this book does. In Arabic-speaking coun-
tries, though, militaries engage in several military operations other than war,
including internal security, regime security, disaster relief, and what civil-mili-
tary relations scholars once labeled nation-building. To truly evaluate Arab
states’ military effectiveness in terms applicable to the concerns of those states’
leaders, these factors must be included.
By focusing only on war, Pollack adapts a particularly Western, and indeed
American, approach. As one example, while militaries in the Middle East have
enjoyed great success in protecting regimes since the 1970s, the author is lim-
ited by his definition of effectiveness to highlighting only Arab military inef-
fectiveness. In fact, he works throughout to “identify the greatest problems
afflicting the Arab armies since 1945” (p. 12). One wonders if his results would
have been different if effectiveness had been defined as “the ability of Arab mil-
itaries to do what their regime leaders need them to do,” or if he had focused
more narrowly on 1967–1991.
As Pollack’s definition of military effectiveness is partial and problematic,
so are his categories for evaluating it. He focuses on unit cohesion, general-
ship, tactical leadership, information management, technical skills and weapons
handling, logistics and maintenance, morale, training, and cowardice. Ulti-
mately he eliminates cowardice as “the most malicious theory” (p. 9) explaining
Arab failure at war and devotes little attention to training. He focuses on these
categories because “over the course of time, different military officers, analysts
and historians” (p. 4) have done so. The author thus remains within tired, older
frameworks.
Similarly, while claiming to examine “the full military histories” (p. 10) of
his chosen countries, he omits key factors explaining military effectiveness that
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have been used elsewhere: professional military education, the cursus hono-
rum of military officers, the nature of the rank pyramid, and indigenous under-
standings of military professionalism. Furthermore, he makes a conscious deci-
sion to leave out “the army’s relationship to its broader society,” labeling it
“extraneous material” (p. 11). I doubt any analyst would consider cultural, intel-
lectual, or economic linkages between military and society as “irrelevant to the
development of effectiveness” (p. 11) in examining, for instance, the factors that
make United States or North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) forces suc-
cessful. The literature on civil-military relations and military professionalism
informs us that this factor is central to evaluating military effectiveness, espe-
cially in the Middle East.
Referring to six different states from Libya to Iraq between 1948 and 1991
and with widely divergent regime types as “Arab” is also perilous. One might
legitimately ask what makes these states Arab per se, and what makes military
performance Arab per se? Are the characteristics he finds Arab, or reflective of
a specific kind of intellectual and political development not solely Arab?
Would his analysis differ markedly if he had included Iran or Pakistan? If not,
are we speaking of Arab, Middle Eastern, or lesser developed countries’ military
effectiveness?
Pollack does not deal with this potential problem through a rigorous dia-
logue with literature in the fields of Middle Eastern studies or cultural anthro-
pology. Rather, in an endnote, he justifies speaking in terms of Arabs because
everyone else talking about poor Arab military performance has “couched their
terms in general statements applicable to all the Arab armed forces.” Also,
“Arab militaries display far more similarities of military effectiveness than dif-
ferences,” permitting consideration of them “as a collective whole” (p. 586).
The first reason sounds like “because everyone else does so, it must be the way”;
the second rationale neither dispels suspicions of a priori assumptions, nor
addresses whether the “collective whole” in question is Arab or something else.
Further, there are places in the book where Arabs as a collective whole, and
Pollack’s chosen categories of analysis, are unsustainable. There is “no ironclad
pattern” (p. 553) of unit cohesion, since “evidence is not entirely consistent”
(p. 554). “No consistent pattern” of generalship emerges because “Arab gener-
alship fluctuated.” Likewise, morale “fluctuated from war to war and army to
army” (p. 568). Given the lack of collective trends in these key categories, ought
the author to speak of Arab armies? Where he does detect trends—as in “poor
tactical leadership, poor information management, poor weapons handling, and
poor weapons maintenance” (p. 574)—are these dynamics Arab? Or are they
characteristic of militaries produced by societies at certain levels of educational
development, with particular kinds of political cultures and regimes, and
ingrained with specific (in this case, Soviet-style) military approaches?
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Still, if one refers to Arab militaries, then at least implicitly, one is speak-
ing in cultural terms—as one would if referring to “Turkic,” “Sinitic,” or “West-
ern” militaries. Yet, Pollack does not broach the topic of culture, either from
the perspective of how an individual county’s military culture influences com-
bat operations, or from the perspective of how Arab culture influences Arab
armies. Yet if one suspects that “the army’s relationship to its broader society”
influences military performance, then examining culture is inescapable. By
eliminating culture as a category, Pollack deprives the reader of a needed ana-
lytical axis.
This omission is perplexing because his dissertation, on which the current
book is based, did deploy culture to good effect.1 Pollack’s retreat from culture
as an explanatory tool was ill-advised in light of his other, derivative, and unsat-
isfactory categories. As just one example of the need to rigorously define and
then examine culture, he rejects cowardice as explaining Arab military prob-
lems. But cowardice is, to some extent, a culturally determined notion. West-
ern militaries’ use of defensive depth and stand-off weapons could easily be
considered cowardly in the eyes of a culture valuing face-to-face combat. In
the broader Middle East, US forces have encountered opponents who do con-
sider such Western fighting styles cowardly, yet who fail to stand and fight to the
last man—a behavior sometimes held to be cowardly in Western terms.
Ultimately, though Pollack quite competently addresses his chosen cate-
gories, the reader is left with the nagging and more profound question of why
Arab militaries act as they do. The author can “identify the greatest problems”
of Arab armies at war, but cannot explain why they exist. An explanation is
necessary.
Readers will find this book a treasure trove of narrative detail, based on an
exhaustive reading of English sources. The absence of Arabic and Hebrew
sources is worrisome, however, as the accumulated studies and memoirs mean
these sources are available. Arabs at War will indeed assist future researchers,
and is remarkably factually accurate. It is regrettable that a work integrating war
and combat operations into the study of the Middle East yields little analytical
originality or nuance.
Note
1. Kenneth M. Pollack, “The Influence of Arab Culture on Arab Military Effectiveness” (PhD
diss., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1996).
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